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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN WISCONSIN
By MABEL SEARCH, A.B., '26
Wisconsin is the first state in the union to give women equal
rights with men under the law. The equal rights bill was passed
June 12, 1921, after a campaign by the Wisconsin branch of the
National Woman's Party, which, after the passage of the federal
suffrage amendment, inaugurated a movement to remove legal
disabilities of women.
Following is a statement by the National Woman's Party regarding the law:
Wisconsin was the first state in the union to take the pioneer step of
granting complete equality before the law to its women. It stands in relation to this new phase of the woman movement in the same position as
Wyoming, the pioneer suffrage state, stood toward suffrage.
Under the laws of Wisconsin today, women stand upon the same basis
as men, freed from the ancient discriminations and disabilities which still
fetter them in other states. Centuries of legal precedent and tradition,
built upon the conception of women as inferior beings, and sanctioning
with the majesty of the law the subjection of one-half of the race, have
been overturned by Wisconsin with one clean stroke.

The above leaves no doubt as to the interpretation of the measure in general terms by its sponsors.
The Wisconsin law,.Chapter 529, Laws of 1921, follows:
SECTION 1. Women shall have the same rights and privileges under the
law as men in the exercise of suffrage, freedom of contract, choice of
residence for voting purposes, jury service, holding office, holding and
conveying property, care and custody of children and in all other respects.
The various courts, executive and administrative officers shall construe
the statutes where the masculine gender is used, to include the feminine
gender unless such construction will deny to females the special protection and privileges which they now enjoy for the general welfare.
The courts, executive and administrative officers shall make all necessary rules and provisions to carry out the intent and purposes of this
statute.
SECTION 2. Any woman drawn to serve as a juror, upon her request to
the presiding judge or magistrate before the commencement of the trial
or hearing, shall be excused from the panel or venire.

No effort was made by the sponsors of the law to have prior
statutes dealing with the rights of women repealed, or to revise
these statutes to conform to the new policy. And, since the law
is general in terms-its sponsors call it a blanket measure-it
remains to be seen which of the prior statutes are repealed by
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implication. Therefore to apply the law specifically is a matter
which only time and experience will settle definitely.
The rights bestowed on unmarried women are chiefly those of
holding office and performing jury service. Previous legislation
had given them freedom of contract. Married women were
denied this right on the theory of protecting the wife's separate
estate.
For example, it was impossible heretofore for a wife to sign as
her husband's surety on a bond or note. The contention was that
by persuasion or through duress the wife might become the
guarantor of her husband's debts. Her separate estate would be
decreased or possibly wiped out in the event of his creditors' pressing the claims. The new law gives married women the right to
contract freely and also ends this protection. Whether the new
condition will work more hardships than benefits remains to be
seen.
It has been suggested that the phrase "special protection and
privileges" might limit the scope of a married woman's right of
freedom of contract as a means of protecting her separate estate.
However, since the law gives women equal rights with men in
freedom of contract, it would seem impossible to abridge this right
even for the benevolent purpose of extending to her under the new
law a privilege which she formerly had.
"Special protection and privileges" can mean nothing but the
shield thrown about women under the police power of the state,
such as minimum wage laws, limiting hours of labor, excluding
women from certain hazardous occupations, etc., the law specifying that the protection and privileges women enjoy for the general
welfare shall not be taken from them in the process of equalizing
the legal status of men and women.
Whether this special protection will be challenged by employers
on the basis of the new law is a matter for the future. The chairman and secretary of the Wisconsin Industrial Commission state
that no attempt has been made in nearly a year since the law has
been on the statute books to nullify these measures, and that none
is anticipated.
Wisconsin's record as a state in which labor legislation applying
to women is generally upheld may be the basis for this confidence.
F. M. Wilcox, chairman of the commission, says:
.. . as to the effect of Chapter 529, Laws of 1921, upon the laws
which have been enacted for the protection of women employees, . ..
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this commission believes that this chapter has no effect whatsoever. Chapter 529 is entitled "An act . . . to remove discriminations against
women and to give them equal rights before the law." The laws which
Wisconsin has had on its statute books for some time for the protection
of women employees, such as the hours of labor law and the minimum
wage law, do not "discriminate against women," but rather protect and
give them special privileges.
This commission has enforced the laws which give a special measure
of protection to women employees since Chapter 529 became effective in
the same manner as heretofore. A considerable number of employers
have been called to account for violations of these laws. No employer or
his attorney has ever urged, however, that Chapter 529 has set aside the
women's hours of labor law or the minimum wage law. This fact we
think significant, especially in view of the fact that articles have appeared
in the east which claim that the women's rights bill has swept away all
special legislation for the protection of women. This is a claim which
only people who know nothing of our laws have urged.
The National Consumer's League-an organization devoted to
the betterment of working conditions for women, is not so
sanguine. Its secretary, Florence Kelley, discussing generally the
national movement for women's rights laws, and giving specific
attention to the Wisconsin law, says:
If women are subject to the same freedom of contract as men, will not
women wage-earners lose the statutory eight-hour day, rest at night, and
one day's rest in seven, which they now have under statutes that, pro tanto,
limit their freedom of contract? Could women get for themselves an
eight-hour law or a minimum-wage commission- in a state where these
do not yet exist, and where working men do not care to get them because
they prefer for themselves negotiations backed by organizations and
strikes ?
Why should wage-earning women be thus forbidden to get laws for
their own health and welfare and that of their unborn children? Why
should they be made subject to the preferences of wage-earning men?
Is not this of great and growing importance when the number of women
wage-earners, already counted by millions, increases by leaps and bounds
from one census to the next? And when the industries involving exposure
to poisons are increasing faster than ever? And when- the overwork of
mothers is one recognized cause of the high infant death-rate? And when
the rise in the mortality of mothers in childbirth continues?
If there were no other way of promoting more perfect equality for
women, an argument could perhaps be sustained for taking these risks.
But why take them when every desirable measure attainable through the
blanket bill can be enacted in the ordinary way?
SEc ON 3. This act shall not affect laws regulating the employment of
women in industry. [The wording of this clause differs from state to
state in the blanket bill.]
Concerning legislative innovations, the important point is not the
promises made by the advocates but what the bill itself says and what
166
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experience has taught the people who will be affected by it to expect. Until
the items of the blanket bill have been passed upon by the courts, what
greater value than patent-medicine advertisements can any claims for the
safe-guarding clause have?
The proponents point to the Wisconsin law enacted a year ago as having wrought no harm. But new laws are not like bombs. They do not
explode. Women cap-makers can never forget that the Sherman law had
been on the statute books for years and wage-earning men and women had
been assured that it could never apply to them. In the end, however,
under a decision of the United States Supreme Court, that anti-trust law
was the cause of the loss of the homes of hundreds of working-class
families in a single state and a single industry.
For women new to the field of legislation, however, the term "safeguarding clause" has an attractive sound. They do not know that in the
processes of enactment, slow and circuitous (or like a lightning flash in
the closing hours of the session), nothing is more easily lost than a safeguarding clause.
In Maryland the blanket bill recently passed the house of delegates
without a repealing clause. If the bill were so enacted, would it (by implication) amend or repeal other laws? Opponents of the bill would
argue that any attempted amendment of the existing law is futile without
a clear statement of the laws to be changed and their wording as amended.
Until the courts had spoken, who could know what the law actually was?
On the other hand, if the blanket bill with its sweeping repealing clause
should pass unchanged, sooner or later the courts would have to decide
whether any laws had been nullified and, if so, which ones. If it should
then be held in spite of the safeguarding clause, as might readily happen, that the wage-earning women's protective laws had been repealed, in
some states the constructive work of years would be undone. The police
power it is true would remain, but fresh legislation would be required to
give it life. The police power does not act spontaneously. As a part of
a blanket bill, the effect of a sweeping repealing clause is incalculable.

The following are possible questions which will be presented to
the courts for solution as the efforts to adjust the law to conditions
progress:
May a husband, dependent on his wife for support, obtain
alimony in case of divorce?
Where husband and wife have separated or are divorced, is the
mother jointly responsible with the father for the support of

children, since women now have equal rights with men in the care
and custody of children?
Can the father still claim the earnings of a minor child or do
they belong jointly to father and mother? Must father and mother

sue jointly for injury to a child?
Since the wife now has the right to choose her residence for
voting purposes, has the husband still the right to fix the family
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domicile? If the wife chooses one voting district and the husband
another, is he obliged to maintain her during the time she is
domiciled in her district? Can he sue for separation or divorce
if the wife chooses a domicile other than his?
Does freedom of contract give her the right to contract with
reference to her dower rights? May she contract with her
husband with reference to such right? Just how far does this
clause go?
Will the clause "holding and conveying property" make any
change in the wife's property rights?
Following are comments on the law made by Wisconsin executive and judicial officers at the request of the National
Woman's Party:
Gov. James J. Blaine said:
You ask in your letter of January 12 that I give you my opinion as to
the value of the Wisconsin equal-rights law, present and prospective, in
the light of our experience ...
There are two ways by which discriminations against women may be
removed and by which equal rights before the law may be conferred. One
method is by a general enactment, such as the law to which I refer, and
the other method is by amending a multiplicity of special statutes on a
variety of subjects treated in the statutes. The first method is simple
and direct; the second is cumbersome, complicated, and inconsistent with
the amendment to the federal constitution granting full privileges and
rights by the fundamental law.
Our experience, therefore, convinces us that the general enactment is
in complete harmony with the federal amendment, and directly effective
in establishing full equality of men and women before the law.

C. H. Crownhart, justice of the state supreme court, said,
prior to his appointment:
...
. This law works no revolution, but rather an evolution whereby
women gradually come into their own.
They are beginning to serve on juries with satisfaction to the public
generally. There are no disturbances in the home or in marriage relations because of the law. As the law becomes more generally known it
will be beneficial in its operations. The women make the home and this
law will help them establish and keep a home. It is a relic of barbarism
that leads some to believe that a husband, no matter how great a tramp
he may be, should start out on a vague quest and call upon his wife like
a squaw to pack her papoose on her back and follow.
The law will bring about a greater and fairer understanding of domestic
relations both by the parties and by the courts. The Wisconsin law has
proved that we usually suffer more from the fears of what may happen
than we do from anything that really does happen. It is a good law.
Time may improve it.
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Circuit Court Judge Oscar M. Fritz, Milwaukee, says:
No litigation involving the Wisconsin equal rights law has been brought
to my attention. I see no reason why the law should not accomplish the
results desired by its sponsors. Its general terms are preferable to
attempts at detailed specification.
Circuit Court Judge E. Ray Stevens of the Ninth Judicial
District of Wisconsin says:
I have had no occasion to apply the Wisconsin equal rights law, aside
from having women on our jury panel. I was pleased to note that women
made very attentive and careful jurors, being the peers in every way of
the men on the panel. They were as readily accepted as jurors as were
the men.
I believe that a general statute like our Wisconsin act is better than
a law which attempts to amend all existing statutes affecting women. In
every such attempt at amendment, it would be well nigh impossible to find
and properly amend every provision of statute that should be amended to
make a complete and harmonious statute. By enacting a single law clearly
evidencing the legislative intent, it must be held that all conflicting acts
existing at the time of the passage of such general act are either repealed
or amended so as to bring all existing laws into harmony with the legislative intent expressed in the general act.

